

Highlights of the week

Vice-presidential showdown: Two weeks to go

As the deadline for the registration of presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 2019 election approaches, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and his potential contender Gerindra Party chairman Prabowo Subianto have yet to name their respective running mates. But the landscape could change as PAN, PKS and Democratic Party are likely to leave Gerindra alone.

JK's maneuvers

In the midst of political turbulence, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s safest bet for running mate in the upcoming presidential election remains his Vice President Jusuf Kalla. His chance, however, is now in the hands of the Constitutional Court.

Concerns remain in the Freeport deal

The divestment of Freeport will turn Rio Tinto’s human rights and environmental problem into Inalum’s problem. Both the government and Inalum need to treat the consequences of Freeport’s divestment with delicacy.

Poultry lobbying ends in price fluctuation for consumers

The lobbying efforts to protect small and medium poultry farms from direct competition with large poultry companies and severe price changes have resulted in fluctuating egg and broiler prices for consumers.



POLITICS

Vice-presidential showdown: Two weeks to go

As the deadline for the registration of presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 2019 election approaches, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and his potential contender Gerindra Party chairman Prabowo Subianto have yet to name their respective running mates. Nevertheless, although the vice-presidential candidates remain undisclosed, particular events throughout the week imply that both contenders have narrowed down their possible running mates to two figures each.

Background: In the second week of July, we reported that Jokowi had shortlisted his vice-presidential candidates to five, weighing their respective political leverage for him. In the third week of July, we reported Prabowo’s possible running mate was even more uncertain than Jokowi’s as he had not even managed to gain support from the parties outside the ruling coalition, namely the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Democratic Party and the National Awakening Party (PAN).

Nevertheless, as the deadline nears, Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s lists of vice-presidential hopefuls are getting shorter. The latest events indicate that former Constitutional Court chief justice Mahfud MD and Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) chairman Ma’ruf Amin remain in contention for nomination as Jokowi’s running mate, while Democratic Party executive Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) and PAN chairman Zulkifli Hasan are reportedly Prabowo’s most probable candidates.

Insight: Jokowi and Prabowo have become entangled in a waiting game; neither side will reveal its vice-presidential candidate until the other discloses his. Nevertheless, such a game is not simply a result of each man’s pettiness but rather it has considerable strategic importance. First, by waiting for their opponent’s candidacy announcement, Jokowi and Prabowo can readjust their choice of running mate accordingly. The importance of flexibility in appointing a vice-presidential candidate is established upon the uncertainties surrounding Indonesian voters’ perspectives of an ideal leader: Is it the one with the best religious credentials? A technocrat? Or one coming from a military or police background? Second, by withholding the announcement of their vice-presidential candidates until the last minute, Jokowi and Prabowo can avoid any possible internal disputes over the chosen running mate. Indeed, this is a risky business, particularly for Jokowi, whose coalition consists of six parties with different preferences as to whom Jokowi should pick as his running mate.

Nevertheless, Jokowi and Prabowo have reportedly prepared several choices. In regard to Jokowi, it is reported that Mahfud MD and Ma’ruf are Jokowi’s two remaining vice-presidential candidates. As for Prabowo, predicting his final vice-presidential candidates is challenging given the incomplete nature of his coalition. Regardless, assuming that the Democratic Party and PAN will confirm their official support for Prabowo in the following days, it is possible that Prabowo’s strongest candidates for the vice-presidential slot are AHY, Democrat executive and eldest son of former president and Democratic Party chairman Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and Zulkifli Hasan, the chairman of PAN.

Jokowi's remaining candidates

Ma'ruf Amin



- **2015 - 2020**
The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) chairman
- **2015 - 2020**
Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU) supreme leader (rais aam)
- **2010 - 2014**
The Presidential Advisory Board (Wantimpres) for Interfaith Affairs member
- **2007 - 2009**
The Presidential Advisory Board (Wantimpres) for Religious Affairs member

Mahfud MD



- **2018 - Present**
The Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education member
- **2008 - 2013**
The Constitutional Court chief justice
- **2004 - 2008**
House of Representatives Commission III member
- **2000 - 2001**
Defence Minister



He granted clemency, for instance, to radical cleric and terrorist convict Abu Bakar Baasyir because of his declining health. Furthermore, Jokowi has initiated international efforts to settle problems facing the Muslim world such as the displacement of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, peace talks between warring groups in Afghanistan and consistent support for Palestinian independence.

Mahfud's impressive performance in state jobs has also built his technocratic image. Considering the looming crisis facing the country, choosing a capable candidate may appease public apprehension and demonstrate Jokowi's genuine attempt to foster sustainable, merit-based development.

Prabowo, on the other hand, presents a different case. As he strengthens his coalition, rumors

circulate every day. However, a series of meetings between him and SBY and Zulkifli indicate that Prabowo's most likely vice-presidential candidates remain AHY and Zulkifli.

Speculation over AHY's bid as Prabowo's running mate is particularly rife following Prabowo's meeting with SBY, which was also attended by AHY. It is no secret that the Democratic Party has relentlessly pursued the possibility of AHY taking up the vice-presidential position. Appointing AHY as Prabowo's running mate, however, could be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, such a decision would secure the support of the Democrats and its 61 seats in the House of Representatives, but choosing AHY would trigger quarrels within the coalition as well.

Following Prabowo's meeting with SBY, for instance, PKS leaders scheduled a separate meeting with Prabowo. The PKS' aversion to such a possibility is also illustrated by its politician Nasir Djamil's statement, claiming that AHY lacked political experience for such a prestigious position as vice president. The same criticism of AHY also came from Gerindra deputy chairman Arif Puyuno.

Another possible issue that may arise from the Prabowo-AHY ticket is their similar military backgrounds, which may reduce their appearance of inclusivity. This may provoke bitter hostility between factions in Indonesia.

Other than the Democratic Party, PAN is another party rumored to be joining Prabowo's coalition in due course. Following his meeting with Prabowo, SBY held talks with Zulkifli. It is widely speculated that the meeting was aimed at discussing the possibility of PAN joining forces with the Democratic Party in supporting Prabowo.

Nevertheless, PAN's support remains the most ambiguous. According to PAN secretary-general Eddy Soeparno, the party's support is still open for either Jokowi or Prabowo. Eddy said, however, his party preferred a coalition that was open and transparent in discussing potential vice-presidential candidates, illustrating the party's dislike of being left out of the discussion.

Regardless, even if PAN decides to support Prabowo, it will most likely nominate its own candidate, Zulkifli. This will surely fragment Prabowo's coalition over the most suitable vice-presidential candidate. Acquiring Democrat Party and PAN support, therefore, will trap Prabowo in the same political dilemma as Jokowi, which is how to choose a candidate without creating internal disagreements.

What we've heard: It seems that PAN, PKS and Democratic Party are planning to leave Gerindra alone due to Prabowo's insistence on contesting the presidential race even though his electability is low.

Sources from PKS said that the party would definitely turn its back off Gerindra if the later took AHY to be Prabowo's running mate, but at the same time the Islamic-based party was assessing a scenario to endorse a Anies-AHY ticket. As the initiator of the #2019GantiPresiden (#2019ChangePresident) movement, PKS is convinced that Anies is the only person that can beat Jokowi in the upcoming election. PKS leader Sohibul Iman is scheduled to meet SBY to discuss on the possibility. The Anies-AHY ticket has also gained supports from young politicians within the Democratic Part. PKS and the Democratic Party will also discuss on future collaboration with PAN.

Executive members and influential young figures from such parties are on their efforts to convince Anies to run. However, they are anticipating a challenge of Anies' reluctance to go against Vice Presidential Jusuf Kalla, who is still looking to run with Jokowi.

On the other hand, to anticipate PKS' maneuver, leading young figures in the Gerindra Party is preparing a scenario of a Sandiaga Uno-AHY ticket, if they manage to convince Prabowo to retract his presidential aspiration and instead become a kingmaker. Nominating Sandiaga is believed to also bring in cottail effect on Gerindra in the legislative election, the reason why the party insists on naming Prabowo its presidential candidate.

JK's maneuvers

In the midst of political turbulence, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s safest bet for running mate in the upcoming presidential election remains his Vice President Jusuf Kalla. On numerous occasions, both Jokowi and Kalla have expressed their mutual eagerness to compete as a pair in the 2019 presidential election, yet Kalla’s possibility of running as vice president for the third time has met with a major legal obstacle.

This does not mean, however, that such an idea is completely dashed, at least until the Constitutional Court, which is hearing a challenge to a particular article in the 2017 Election Law that prohibits Kalla from seeking a third term, rules otherwise.

Background: Article 169 of the 2017 Election Law stipulates that a president or vice president cannot seek a third term of office, regardless of whether they have served for two consecutive terms or not. Considering that Kalla has previously served as vice president during Susilo Bambang Yudhono’s (SBY) presidency, this legal barrier limits Jokowi’s chance of picking Kalla as his running mate for a second time.

However, the United Indonesia Party (Perindo) filed a judicial review with the Constitutional Court (MK) against the article, claiming that the law only prohibits a president or vice president from seeking a third term *consecutively*. Perindo says the article deprives it of the right to nominate Kalla as VP candidate.

Insight: Apart from Mahfud MD and Ma’ruf Amin, Jokowi’s main potential vice-presidential candidate is none other than the current Vice President Kalla. Indeed, his vast experience in political, social, humanitarian, and religious realms makes him an ideal candidate for Jokowi. Nevertheless, Article 169 of the 2017 Election Law stands in his path to the vice-presidential nomination, at least for now.

Following Perindo’s judicial review of the article, the possibility of Kalla becoming Jokowi’s deputy for the second time is not so remote. Furthermore, Kalla’s direct involvement in the judicial review, showing his willingness to become Jokowi’s running mate in the upcoming election, should not be underestimated.

Now, the final decision is in the hands of the Constitutional Court justices, and whether they will grant the petition or not will affect Indonesia’s political map significantly. First, if the court allows Kalla to serve as vice president for a third time, it will help Jokowi avoid cracks within his coalition. Reportedly, all parties in Jokowi’s coalition, except the Golkar Party,

have approved Kalla's nomination as Jokowi's running mate. Furthermore, compared to Ma'ruf and Mahfud, Kalla offers a considerably more flexible approach in addressing the aspirations of conservative Muslims. Finally, Kalla will provide much-needed stability for Jokowi's future administration, in the face of economic challenges ahead of the country.

Nevertheless, such a decision would also provoke questions concerning political legitimacy. It is reported that a number of factions are against the idea of amending the Election Law, on democratic grounds; it is feared that if senior officials succeed in amending the law now, they will not hesitate to do so again in the future. Furthermore, the opposition will most likely attack the legitimacy of Jokowi's presidency should he win.

On the other hand, if the court rejects the petition, Indonesia's political map may drastically change as Kalla can run for president himself, unless Jokowi offers him a key role both in his campaign team and in the future administration.

To conclude, it is difficult to predict Kalla's future role in Indonesian politics before the court delivers its ruling. Regardless, based on the current political atmosphere, it is very likely that Kalla will play a significant role in the future, whether as vice president or not.

What we've heard: As protest against Kalla's third-time vice presidential bid has mounted, his supporters have arranged public discussions to garner public supports to influence MK. At the same time, Kalla is also approaching his supporters in the Golkar Party to back his effort. Several party senior politicians have expressed a change of support for Kalla. It is said that Kalla will also appoint prominent constitutional court expert Yusril Ihza Mahendra to be his legal representative to win his case.

BUSINESS & ECONOMIC POLICY

RI signs non-binding agreement with Freeport and Rio Tinto, concerns remain

The government and United States gold and copper miner Freeport McMoran (FCX) reached a milestone in their reportedly tight divestment negotiation.

Background: On July 12, all parties, including Rio Tinto, signed the heads of agreement (HoA) while designating state-owned mining holding company PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium (Inalum) as the main buyer.

Based on the mutually approved scheme, the ownership transfer will occur under the following steps. The first step involves a US\$1 billion payment to Rio Tinto in exchange for its 40 percent participating interest. After that, PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI) will offer a rights issue to PT Rio Tinto Indonesia (RTI), so RTI will own 100 percent of PTFI's equity. Then, Inalum's participating interest will be converted into 40 percent equity in RTI.

In the next step, Inalum will pay another \$2.5 billion to FCX that will be shared with Rio Tinto, under the assumption that the total valuation of PTFI is \$6.25 billion. Lastly, Inalum will buy PTFI's equity from Indocopper at a price of \$350 million. Combining the \$3.85 billion transaction with the existing 9 percent PTFI equity held by the government, Inalum will hold 51 percent ownership of PTFI through RTI.¹

This complicated deal is still incomplete because there are some issues that were not resolved in the negotiation.

Insight: The government strives for this divestment because it is not only politically rewarding, but also economically potentials. By completing this deal, the government expects to receive additional non-tax income in its coffers. Nevertheless, statistical evidence shows that the government's optimism is a bit inflated. In fact, PTFI did not pay dividends to the government in 2012-2016 due to the end of global commodity boom that hurt its revenue. Moreover, the amount of tax income paid to the government had declined sharply in the aforementioned period (see the Figure below).

The decline in PTFI revenue partly explains the desire of the Anglo-Australian company Rio Tinto to leave Grasberg, despite Grasberg's mineral reserves that amount to \$150 billion in potential revenue. The other reason is pressure from investors regarding the tainted human rights and environmental records surrounding Freeport's Grasberg operations over the decades.

Freeport's Grasberg is notorious for its waste disposal management. By exploiting the gap in Indonesian mining law, Freeport utilizes a riverine tailing waste disposal system, contaminating the surrounding environment with hazardous waste from copper and other heavy metal materials.

¹ Detikcom, "Blak-blakan Budi Sadikin: Rp 55 T demi rebut Freeport!!" 19 July 2018 (video interview) <https://tinyurl.com/yd42r6bk>



This waste harms the biodiversity as well as the health of the surrounding local population. Freeport's hazardous waste management is traceable as far as the Arafura Sea.²

Freeport's infamous environmental management hurt Rio Tinto's reputation among institutional investors. Some investors had even divested their investments, which accounted more than \$2 billion in 2008-2012 period (see the Table below). The hardest rebuke came from the Norwegian government, which labeled the Rio Tinto joint venture with Freeport as grossly unethical and blacklisted the company from its sovereign investment fund after releasing an official paper that denounces Rio Tinto's investment in Grasberg. It is also important to know that Grasberg's operation has been deemed as "environmentally damaging" by an independent US Government Agency in 1995, which costed Freeport its international political risk insurance, citing it contravened the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.³

Name of Entity	Amount	Status	Year	From
Government Pension Fund of Norway	NOK 4,85 billion (USD 597 million)	Divested	2008	Rio Tinto
New Zealand Superannuation Fund	More than USD 1 billion	Divested	2012	Freeport McMoran
Swedish AP Pension Fund	Unspecified	Divested	2013	Freeport - Rio Tinto Papua Operation
Five New York City Pension Funds	Unspecified	Threatened to divest	2009	Freeport - Rio Tinto Papua Operation
APG Group	Unspecified	Threatened to divest	2009	Freeport - Rio Tinto Papua Operation
General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church	Unspecified	Threatened to divest	2009	Freeport - Rio Tinto Papua Operation

Source: www.minesandcommunities.org

² AFR.com, "Giant mine spewing waste into river becomes a battle ground" 6 June 2018 <https://tinyurl.com/ydcadt8>

³ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires overseas investment projects to not pose unreasonable or major environmental hazards or cause the degradation of tropical forest.

Besides the environmental issue, Rio Tinto's joint venture with Freeport has received condemnation from various human rights organization and pro-human rights investors. They highlight Freeport's on-site security arrangement with the Indonesian Military (TNI) and National Police as a million-dollar corruption business that marginalizes the livelihood and dignity of native Papuans, stealing their customary land by force and committing unlawful killings.⁴

Because of these reasons, Rio Tinto took the Indonesian offer as a chance to clean its portfolio from the eye of concerned investors as well as various human rights and environmental non-governmental organizations.⁵

The takeaway: The divestment of PTFI will turn Rio Tinto's human rights and environmental problem into Inalum's problem. Both the government and Inalum need to treat the consequences of Freeport's divestment with delicacy.

What we've heard: Despite signing the HoA with FCX, a number of problems persist within the divestment. The issue of an operating committee in PTFI has not been resolved yet and tends to be problematic due to its ability to intervene the board of directors' decision while also capable of dismissing board members and ignoring board directives.

According to several government officials, Freeport initially asked to maintain the status-quo where the committee remains atop of the board in the organization's structure. However, the government rejected the request by referring to Regulation No 40/2007 on limited liability companies (PT), which specifies a company's decision under the board of directors' authority and responsibility. Although the HoA implies Freeport's approval on the term, both FCX and the government have not reached any agreement on the operating committee's responsibility and role post-divestment.

The issue of the operating committee turned prominent after the Indonesian government and Freeport began to discuss on the boards of directors and commissioners' composition. Both parties concurred that the board should neither be politicians nor political appointees, but someone with a professional background who is capable of executing PTFI's long-term business plan.

Nonetheless, FCX and the government have different views regarding who can select board members. Freeport considers itself eligible to select board of directors and commissioners' members following their agreement on divestment and smelter development, while the government thinks the right belongs to both of them.

In the process, the miner suggested that it should have three representatives on the board of directors and board of commissioners, leaving Inalum with two representatives on each of the board. In addition, it also demanded veto power. Both demands were met with objections. After numerous negotiations, both parties have finally agreed to have an equal number of representatives on the boards and erase veto power from the table.

⁴ Aljazeera.com, "Mining companies funded Indonesian abuses", 11 October 2018
<https://tinyurl.com/yamp45e3>

⁵ AFR.com, "Time right for Rio Tinto to retreat from Grasberg Project" 5 June 2017
<https://tinyurl.com/yao8tdcj>

Considering FCX's operational and safety expertise, Indonesia hopes for Freeport to remain as leader in operational and technical aspects, especially underground mining, giving the company the authority to fill in key positions in those areas. Meanwhile, the government wishes to control marketing, finance, legal and human resources aspects of the company despite attempting to gradually reduce FCX's involvement in technical operations.

The Special Mining Permit (IUPK) is another hindrance to the negotiations. The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry promised to issue an IUPK after the negotiations, including the solution for several unfinished environment violations. The Environment and Forestry Ministry noted 48 points stressing Freeport's weak waste and environmental management system, where 13 were considered as very environmentally damaging relating to waste tailing. Under the newly proposed regulation, only 10 percent of tailing is allowed to be freely disposed. Freeport must accommodate 90 percent of the tailing in the Modified Ajkwa Deposition Area in Mimika regency, Papua. Previously, only 50 percent of the tailing was kept, leaving 50 percent to be discarded in natural water systems.


The special mining permit would also affect smelter development. The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry has stressed it won't issue any permit until divestment is completed, regardless of Freeport's stance to not build any smelter without an operating permit extension. A delay in the IUPK would certainly mean delayed development of the smelter. Freeport wanted to begin building no later than five years after the permit's issuance. Meanwhile, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry demanded for the smelter to start operating in 2020.

In a meeting at Mandiri Club Jakarta in early July 2018, FCX CEO Richard Adkerson requested that an additional permit for financial stability be excluded from IUPK attachment, as he was concerned that changes in Indonesia's political regime may impact Freeport's operational stability in Papua. Under the same rationale, Freeport has also asked all agreements on investment security to be made in one separate regulation. The government has declined the request, arguing that its inclusion in the IUPK was sufficient.

At the same time, the government and FCX still have not agreed on arbitration matters. The Energy and Mineral Resources Minister wanted all disputes to be resolved in domestic arbitration while Freeport demanded that they be settled in Singapore. These are all the problems that Indonesia must figure out if the government wishes to conclude divestment in around two months.

Poultry lobbying ends in price fluctuation for consumers

Agriculture Minister Andi Amran Sulaiman has been running market intervention since July 19 to drive down the price of eggs from the average Rp 28,000 per kg to the government price of Rp 22,000 per kg (see the Figure below).



Background: The price intervention is a blow to the minister's poultry export ambitions.⁶ It also put Minister Amran's claim of a production surplus⁷ into question, similar to the earlier controversy over the rice production data.⁸

Aside from the fluctuating egg prices, the Agriculture Ministry still needs to stabilize broiler prices, which has surged to Rp 41,300 per kg (see the Figure below). The surge is a break from seasonal patterns. Broiler prices usually tend to fall to Rp 31,000 per kg after long annual holidays such as the yearend Christmas and New Year holiday, as well as Idul Fitri (Lebaran).


Insight: Food price fluctuations are common in developing countries like Indonesia, but the current fluctuations in egg and broiler prices are unusual, because they followed intense lobbying from organizations grouping small and medium poultry farms, such as the Indonesia Layer Chicken Breeders Association (PINSAR) and the National Poultry Breeders Association (GOPAN); the lobbying began in 2015 and intensified in 2016.⁹

⁶ Merdeka.com, "Mentan soal harga telur tinggi: bukan karena produksi, kita sudah ekspor" 23 July 2018 <https://tinyurl.com/yd8afu34>

⁷ Beritasatu.com, "Produksi telur surplus 10,920 ton" 21 July 2018 <https://tinyurl.com/y73lkkyb>

⁸ CNNIndonesia.com, "Ombudsman kritik data stok beras kementerian pertanian" 15 January 2018 <https://tinyurl.com/ydx2oxko>

⁹ Trobos.com, "Peternak broiler: Yang tertekan, yang meradang" 1 April 2016 <https://tinyurl.com/y9prhqbx>




At first, the lobby's objective was to protect small and medium poultry farms from direct competition with large poultry companies such as Japfa Comfeed, Charoen Pokphand and Sierad Produce by limiting future expansion into the live poultry market.¹⁰

Later, the lobby expanded its objective to include the protection of small and medium poultry farmers from sudden and severe price changes, such as the sudden price drop in 2016 (see the Figure below), through a revision to Agriculture Minister Regulation No. 26/2016. The revised regulation, Agriculture Minister Regulation No. 61/2016, mandates large poultry companies to sell 50 percent of their day-old chicks (DOCs) to small and medium poultry farms.¹¹

¹⁰ PINSARIndonesia.com, "Saatnya regulasi pembatasan di sektor budidaya unggas diterbitkan" 19 July 2016 <https://tinyurl.com/ybwfbhgd>

¹¹ Bisnis.com, "Peternak mandiri: Permentan ayam ras harus dikawal" 2 January 2017 <https://tinyurl.com/yd4nlxly>



In March 2017, the Agriculture Ministry passed Ministerial Decree No. 3035/2017, which mandated all poultry breeders to reduce their broiler and layer chicken population, especially DOCs, in order to prevent prices from sliding further. Because of this decree, the DOC population fell by 6.8 million chicks to 9.5 million (see the Table below). The sharp fall in the broiler and layer chicken population caused an unintended and sharp increase in egg and broiler prices.

National Poultry Population

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Broiler Parent Stock (PS)	11,320.99	9,815.97	18,949.77	12,432.11	10,115.31
Layer Day-old Chick (DOC)	7,488.08	9,550.50	7,253.77	16,322.62	9,579.76

Source: Central Statistics Agency (BPS)

The takeaway: It is ironic that the lobbying efforts to protect small and medium poultry farms from direct competition with large poultry companies and severe price changes have resulted in fluctuating egg and broiler prices for consumers.

Indonesia's 26th Agriculture Minister Andi Amran Sulaiman



- ! Appointed by President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo as Agriculture Minister in 2014
- ! Previously was Jokowi's Financier in Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia campaign
- ! Amran was the coordinator of *Sahabat Rakyat untuk Indonesia Timur*, a partisan support group which donated Rp 500 mio for Jokowi-JK campaign in South Sulawesi in 2014

Higher education history:

- Bachelor of Agriculture, Hasanudin University, Makassar (1988-1993)
- Master of Agriculture, Hasanudin University, Makassar (2002-2003)
- Doctor of Agricultural Science, Hasanudin University, Makassar (2008-2012)

Business profile:

Founder and president director, Tiran Group

- ➔ The group initially started as home industry focusing on rat poison
- ➔ Today, Tiran is a South Sulawesi based multi-sector conglomerate, comprising of 14 subsidiaries
- ➔ Among them are : PT Tiran Indonesia, PT Tiran Sulawesi, PT Tiran Makassar, PT Tiran Mineral, PT Amrul Nadin, CV Empos Tiran, CV Profita Lestari dan CV Empos
- ➔ The group is also reported to be active in gold and nickel mining, sugar and palm plantation, gas station chains, Unilever's distributor and cement production
- ➔ Total reported asset in 2014: more than Rp 1 trillion

Known as:

Amran Sulaiman

Date of birth:

Bone (South Sulawesi), April 27, 1968

Family background:

Descendant of La Pawawoi Arung Sumaling, the fourth generation of La Tenri Tappu, the 23rd King of Bone

"Egg price disparity has reached 60 percent because business players take too much profits" - July 19 -

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