

## EVENT ANALYSIS

### REVIEW OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

#### Political Year of 2017: Political Consolidation and Challenges of Local Democracy

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##### Introduction

2017 can be seen as a political year. Numerous of important political events occurred throughout the year, and this year, Jokowi – Jusuf Kalla administration enters its third year in service. Surveys conducted in the early third year of administration shows increased satisfaction towards the government. Meanwhile, the discussion on General Election Bill (*Rancangan Undang-Undang (RUU) Penyelenggaraan Pemilu*) in the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)*) which was initiated by the government, turned tough. Whereas on local level, the simultaneous conduct of second round of local direct election (Pilkada), after the first round on 15 February 2017, will be a challenge for our local democratic resilience.

This writing will examine public evaluation towards Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla performance in their second year and their challenges in the third year of administration. This writing will also analyze some crucial issues in the discussion of General Election Bill and each fraction's stance on it. Lastly, this writing will describe the simultaneous second round of Pilkada 2017, its challenges and implementation, along with some notes for the third simultaneous Pilkada in 2018. Some issues will be highlighted, such as issue on political corruption and the spread of political dynasty, the emergence of single candidates, and the implementation of Pilkada in DKI Jakarta 2017.

##### Consolidation of Power

Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration had entered their third year on last October 2016. In their third year, Jokowi is relatively successful in building public optimism and consolidating power. Public optimism can be seen from the rise of public satisfaction towards the governance, compared to the previous year. Some surveys conducted by research institutes shows that satisfaction level to Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla has passed 60 percent (See Table 1). The survey from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), for example, shows that public satisfaction towards Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla performance rises around 16 percent from 50,6 percent in October 2015, to 66.5 percent in August 2016<sup>1</sup>. Meanwhile, a survey from SMRC shows 69 percent of

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<sup>1</sup>. CSIS, 2 *Tabun Jokowi: Optimism Publik, Konsolidasi Kekuasaan dan Dinamika Elektoral*, August 2016


public satisfaction towards Jokowi-JK administration<sup>2</sup>, and survey from *Indikator Politik Indonesia* shows 68 percent<sup>3</sup>. Nevertheless, the rise of satisfaction towards Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla performance is not complemented with satisfaction to the performance of the Working Cabinet (*Kabinet Kerja*). According to CSIS, only 56 percent of respondent expresses satisfaction to the cabinet performance.

**Table 1.**  
**Satisfaction to Government Performance based on surveys**

No	Institution	Survey Period	Number of Respondents	MoE	Satisfaction to Government (%)
1	CSIS	8-15 August 2016	1.000	3,1%	64%
2	SMRC	13-17 October 2016	1.035	3,1%	69%
3	Indikator	1-9 August 2016	1.22	2,9%	68%

A survey from CSIS also shows that satisfaction to government increase in all main sectors. Highest satisfaction is in Maritime Sector which rises from 59,4 percent in October 2015 to 63,9 percent in August 2016 (See Figure 1).

**Figure 1.**  
**Public Satisfaction to Government Performance in Some Main Sectors.**



When the data of satisfaction towards government performance was cross-tabulated with demographic factors, it indicates that those who are male, live in rural area, and within Java island are more satisfied than those who are female, live in urban area, and outside Java island (See Table 2).

<sup>2</sup>. Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, *Dua Tahun Pemerintah Jokowi-JK, Evaluasi Publik Nasional*, October 2016.

<sup>3</sup>. Indikator Politik Indonesia, *Kinerja Pemerintahan Jokowi Pasca Reshuffle Jilid-2*, August 2016

**Table 2**  
**Public Satisfaction to Government's Performance based on Demographic Factor (1)**

KETERANGAN	BASELINE	SATISFIED	NOT SATISFIED	TT/TJ	TOTAL
<b>GENDER</b>					
Male	50,0	68,6%	31,2%	0,2%	100,0%
Female	50,0	64,4%	34,4%	1,2%	100,0%
<b>AREA CHARACTERISTIC</b>					
Urban cities	49,5	64,0%	35,2%	0,8%	100,0%
Rural areas	50,5	68,9%	30,5%	0,6%	100,0%
<b>ISLAND</b>					
Java	57,5	68,5%	31,1%	0,3%	100,0%
Outside Java	42,5	63,8%	35,1%	1,2%	100,0%

On the matter of education and income, it shows that society with lower income and education are more satisfied compared to those with higher education and income (see Table 3).

**Table 3.**  
**Public Satisfaction to Government's Performance based on Demographic Factor (2)**

INDICATOR	BASELINE	SATISFIED	NOT SATISFIED	TT/TJ	TOTAL
<b>EDUCATION</b>					
<=SD	31,1	72,7%	26,0%	1,3%	100,0%
Junior High	15,5	64,5%	35,5%	0,0%	100,0%
High School	40,7	63,4%	35,9%	0,7%	100,0%
Academy/University	12,7	63,8%	36,2%	0,0%	100,0%
<b>INCOME</b>					
<= Rp 999.000	17,8	75,3%	24,2%	0,6%	100,0%
Rp 1.000.000-Rp 1.999.000	42,2	65,4%	33,6%	0,9%	100,0%
More than Rp 2.000.000	39,2	64,3%	35,5%	0,3%	100,0%
TT/TJ	0,8	37,5%	50,0%	12,5%	100,0%


In the matter of power consolidation, Jokowi's success in muting the effect of second cabinet reshuffle towards party coalition, and the ability of Jokowi in establishing communication with the leader of party coalition, demonstrates the maturity of Jokowi politics. Unlike at the first reshuffle, Jokowi are were able to show his prerogative rights as President at the second reshuffle.

Meanwhile, entering the third year, Jokowi performs with high confidence, both with the internal supporting party, and party outside the governance. This confidence grows after the support of *Partai Golkar* and *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN) in the Working Cabinet. A survey

from CSIS Jakarta (2016) shows that 71 percent of respondent believes the President are able to organize a large coalition, after the participation of *Partai Golkar* and *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN). Golkar and PAN participation increases Jokowi-Jussuf Kalla power mapping to above 65 percent of the total seats in the DPR. Meanwhile, Jokowi's relation with Gerindra is also relatively good, although Gerindra is not the supporting party of government. Jokowi often meet with Chief Patron of Gerindra Party, Prabowo Subianto.

Publicly, Jokowi's confidence is supported by the surge of public trust towards President, from 79,7 percent in 2015 to 87,6 percent in 2016 (CSIS, 2016). A survey from CSIS, August 2016, reveals that Jokowi and Prabowo were two very strong figure that will be elected should an election was conducted at the time of the survey. 41,9 percent of respondent would choose Jokowi, and 24,3 percent would choose Prabowo Subianto as President. The result for Jokowi's electability grows for 5,8 percent than the previous year. Meanwhile, Prabowo's electability declines 3,7 percent. Other names were below 6 percent (See Figure 2)

**Figure 2**  
**Electability of Presidential Candidate**



## The Dynamic of Discussion on General Election Bill

Discussion in General Election Bill<sup>4</sup> is predicted to revolve around some crucial issues. Among others are the system of legislative election, the number of seats in the DPR, district magnitude, presidential candidate threshold, parliamentary threshold (PT), votes to seat conversion method, and mechanism to determine elected candidate. *First*, the system of legislative election proposed to the DPR is an open-free proportional system. Within the system, voters no longer chose the picture or name of candidates, but the symbol or name of the party. From the List of Issues (*Daftar Inventarisir Masalah* (DIM)) fractions per 24 January 2017, fractions are still fragmented. (See Table 4). Two big parties such as *PDI Perjuangan* and *Golkar* supported the implementation of this system. While, other parties tend to retain the old system, using open proportion with most votes. *Second*, the number of seats in DPR. Article 155 of Bill on Implementation of

<sup>4</sup>. General Election bill is a bill initiated by the government of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. This bill is the combination of three bills, which are bill on Presidential Election, Bill on Legislative Election, and Bill on the Implementation of Election

Election stated that “The total seats for members of DPR are determined at 560 (five hundred and sixty).” In DIM, Golkar Party believed there’s a need to increase the number of seats based on the following reason: adjusting with general formula, which is the cube root of the total population, actualize proportionality of total representative and the constituent, and to keep pace with provincial and district proliferation that had occurred.<sup>5</sup> According to DIM, there are four parties who agreed with the addition of DPR members, which are: Golkar, Gerindra, PKB and Nasdem. Amid the weak performance and low public trust to DPR, the proposal to increase its member is likely to receive public resistance.

*Third*, district magnitude per constituency. Currently, there is disproportionality between the total population compared with assigned seats for political party. Some constituencies experience over-representation, while others suffer from under-representation. In this matter, *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB) propose that division of constituency should note the following principles: the value of representation; adherence to the system of election; proportionality; territorial integration; within one are coverage; cohesivity; and continuity.<sup>6</sup> According to PKB, division of constituency is done through two phase, which are: (a) allocation of seats to Provinces, and (b) allocation of seats for each province per constituency. Allocation of DPR seats to provinces is determined by first understand the value of one seat by dividing the number of national population with the number of seats; and determining the number of seats for each province by dividing the provincial inhabitants with the total population, times the number of DPR seat.

Meanwhile, allocation of seats in every province to each constituency is done as follows:

(a) determine the value of one seat in provincial level

by dividing the number of provincial inhabitants with the number of seat in each province; and (b) determining the number of seats for each constituency by dividing the population of each constituency with the total of provincial inhabitants, times the number of DPR seat in that province. According to Article 156 paragraph 2 stated that “The minimum number of DPR seat for each constituency is 3 (three) and maximum of 10 (ten) seats.” Some fractions also disagree with the government’s proposal for various reasons.

*Fourth*, the threshold for President and Vice President becomes a heated discussion in the DPR. According to the Bill, the government will use the old threshold, as written in Article 190 which is “Pairs of Candidate are nominated by Political Party or Coalition of Political Party participating in the election with at least 20 percent of the total DPR seat or have gained 25 percent of national votes in the previous DPR election.”

PAN and Gerindra Party proposed to delete the abovementioned qualification because it is against the decision of Supreme Court No. 14/PUU-XI-2013 regarding the simultaneous implementation of election. PAN proposes a substantive modification to “Pairs of Candidate are nominated by political party or coalition of political parties participating in the election”. According to PAN, every political party has been verified to participate in the election, hence they should have had the right to nominate the pairs of candidate.<sup>7</sup> The same opinion was given by Gerindra and propose modification to “Every political party that is participant of election may nominate candidate of President and Vice President”

*Fifth*, parliamentary threshold. Within the draft, the government retains the current parliamentary threshold, which is 3,5 percent from the total of national votes for a party to be eligible for allocation of seats in DPR. Parties stance in this regard is heavily fragmented. Golkar Party proposes 10 percent. Golkar deemed that 10 percent will result to a moderate pluralistic party system that is compatible with the presidential system.<sup>8</sup> Below the threshold from Golkar, Nasdem proposes a threshold of 7 percent and afterwards PDIP proposes 5 percent. While

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<sup>5</sup>. Daftar Inventarisir Masalah (DIM), *RUU Penyelenggaraan Pemilu*, hlm. 671.

<sup>6</sup>. *Ibid*, hlm. 673-675.

<sup>7</sup>. *Ibid*, hlm. 773.

<sup>8</sup>. *Ibid*, 1233.

other fractions retain the threshold at 3,5 percent. Meanwhile, PAN in DIM proposes the deletion of parliamentary threshold.

*Sixth*, votes to seat conversion method is divided into four calculation method, which are Kuota Hare which has been implemented in the previous elections, Saint Lague Murni, Saint Lague Modifikasi, and D'Hondt. *Seventh*, mechanism to determine legislative candidate. Two big fractions (PDIP and Golkar) chose to determine legislative candidate based on candidate's number. The majority of fraction opt based on the most votes. Aside from crucial issues, challenges ahead includes limited time and the plethora of members of Pansus who also become the member of Commission II of the DPR that are currently selecting members of KPU and Bawaslu. Given the limited deadline, Special Committee (*Panitia Khusus* (Pansus) for the Bill established three teams, one of them is team for crucial issues discussed in *Rapat Panitia Kerja* (Panja) consisting of 19 members, synchronization team, and language team.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 4.**  
**Fraction Stance in DPR relating Some Crucial Issues in General Election Bill**

Indicator	Election System	Number of Seats in DPR	Allocation of seats per constituency	Presidential Threshold	Parliamentary Threshold	Votes to Seat Conversion	Determining Legislative Candidate
RUU	Open-Free	560	3-10	20% seat/ 25% vote	3.5%	Saint Lague Modifikasi	Candidate's number
PDIP	Open-Free	560	3-8	20% seat/ 25% vote	5%	Saint Lague Modifikasi	Candidate's number
Golkar	Closed	619	3-6	20% seat/ 25% vote	10%	D'Hondt	Candidate's number
Gerindra	Open	570	3-8	0%	3.5%	Saint Lague Murni	Most vote
Demokrat	*	*	**	*	*	Saint Lague Murni	*
PAN	Open	560	4-10	0%	0%	Kuota Hare	Most vote
PKB	Open	619	3-10	20% seat/ 25% vote	5%	Kuota Hare	Most vote
PKS	Open	560	3-10	20% seat/ 25% vote	3.5%	Kuota Hare	Most vote
PPP	Open	560	3-12	25% seat/ 30% vote	3.5%	Kuota Hare	Most vote
Nasdem	Open	Higher	4-11	20% seat/ 25% vote	7%	Kuota Hare	Most vote
Hanura	Open	**	**	40% seat/ 25% vote	3.5%	Saint Lague Murni	Most vote

Source: *Daftar Inventarisir Masalah* (DIM) General Election Bill per 24 January 2017

\*Waiting for government clarification

\*\*Has not had a stance

## Face of Local Democracy

<sup>9</sup>. Kompas, *Komitmen DPR Dinuji, Sikap Fraksi Terbelah oleh Sedikitnya Lima Isu Krusial*, 20 Januari 2017.

On 15 February 2017, the second wave of Pilkada was conducted in 101 areas consist of: 7 provinces, 18 cities, 76 districts/cities.<sup>10</sup> In general, the election was fair, democratic, and safe. From the committees' perspective, the General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU)) successfully modernize the conduct of Pilkada in many aspects. Starting from the digitalization of voter's data, candidate's and supporting party's profile, up to real count results right after the polling stations were closed in some areas, which was done by uploading C1-form online (e-recap) by the Poling Committee (*Panitia Pemungutan Suara*).

Real count results done by KPU showed that from 7 provinces having Pilkada, 5 (five) of them was won by opposing candidate, and only 2 (two) was won by the incumbent, which are DKI Jakarta and Gorontalo. Meanwhile, DKI Jakarta must hold a second round of election on 1 April 2017, because none of the candidates reached more than 50 percent votes.<sup>11</sup> (See Table 5). DKI Jakarta regulation on Pilkada differs with other regions because of different settings. Pilkada in other region, is regulated based on Law regarding Gubernatorial, Regent, and Mayoral Election (*UU Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati dan Walikota*). While winning condition in DKI Jakarta is regulated in Law on Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta (*UU tentang Pemprov DKI Jakarta*).

**Table 5.**

**Name of Candidate, Map of Support, Votes, Winner Status, and Level of Voter's Participations in 7 Provinces in Pilkada 2017**

No	Province	Candidate No.	Name of Candidate	Supporters	Votes	Winner Status	Voter's Participation
1	Aceh	1	Tarmizi A. Karim - T. Machsalmina Ali	Golkar, Nasdem, PPP	16,84%	Opposition	73%
		2	Zakaria Saman - T. Alaidinsyah	Independent	5,53%		
		3	Abdullah Puteh - Sayed Mustafa Usab Al-Idroes	Independent	1,76%		
		4	Zaini Abdullah - Nasaruddin	Independent	6,93%		
		5	Muzakir Manaf - T. A Khalid	Partai Aceh, Gerindra, PBB, PKS	31,79%		
		6	Irwandi Yusuf - Nova Iriansyah	PN Aceh, Demokrat, Partai Damai Aceh, PKB, PDIP	37,16%		
2	Bangka Belitung	1	Yusron Ihza - Yusroni Yazid	PPP, PBB, Demokrat	19,10%	Opposition	61,9%
		2	Rustam Effendi - Muhammad Irwansyah	PDIP	22,70%		
		3	Hidayat Arsani - Sukirman	Hanura, PKS, PAN, Golkar	19,27%		
		4	Erzaldi Rosman - Abdul Fatah	Gerindra, Nasdem, PKB	38,94%		
3	DKI Jakarta	1	Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono - Sylviana Murni	Demokrat, PPP, PKB, PAN	17,06%	Incumbent	77,1%
		2	Basuki Tjahaja Purnama - Djarot Saiful Hidayat	PDIP, Hanura, Golkar, Nasdem	42,96%		
		3	Anies Baswedan - Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno	PKS, Gerindra	39,97%		
4	Banten	1	Wahidin Halim -	Golkar, PKB, Hanura,	50,93%	Opposition	63%

<sup>10</sup>. [www.kpu.go.id](http://www.kpu.go.id)

<sup>11</sup>. For more information see Article 11 Law No. 29/2007 on Government of DKI Jakarta as the Capital of Indonesia (*UU Pemerintahan Provinsi Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta sebagai Ibukota Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*).

			Andika Hazrumy	Gerindra, Demokrat, PKS, PAN			
			Rano Karno - Embay Mulya Syarif	PDIP, Nasdem, PPP	49,07%		
5	Gorontalo	1	Hana Hasana Fadel - Tonny S. Junus	PPP, Gerindra, PKB, PDIP	25,86%	Incumbent	81,6%
		2	Rusli Habibie - Idris Rahim	Golkar, Demokrat	50,65%		
		3	Zainuddin Hasan - Adhan Dambea	PAN, Hanura, PKS	23,49%		
6	Sulawesi Barat	1	Suhardi Duka - Kalma Katta	Demokrat, Hanura, PKS	38,01%	Opposition	74,7%
		2	Salim S. Mengga - Hasanuddin Mashud	Golkar	23,24%		
		3	Ali Baal - Enry Anggraeany Anwar	Gerindra, Nasdem, PKB, PAN, PDIP, PPP	38,76%		
7	Papua Barat	1	Dominggus Mandacan - Mohamad Lakotani	Nasdem, PDIP, PAN	56,82%	Incumbent	74,3%
		2	Irene Manibuy - Abdullah Manaray	Hanura, PKS, PPP, PKB	14,79%		
		3	Stepanus Malak - Ali Hindom	Golkar, Demokrat	28,39%		

Source: General Election Commission (2017), compiled.

Although the second wave of Pilkada ran smoothly, there are at least two important notes. *First*, the emergence of single candidates. Data from KPU showed that there were 9 regions participated by single candidate, among others Kota Tebing Tinggi, Kabupaten Tulang Bawang, Kabupaten Landak, Kabupaten Buton, Kabupaten Pati, Kabupaten Maluku Tengah, Kabupaten Tambraw, Kota Sorong, dan Kota Jayapura.<sup>12</sup> There are some explanations for the high number of single candidates, one of them is the candidate qualification, be it for political party or independent candidate. In Article 40 on Law No. 10/2016 regarding Pilkada, it is stated that "Political party or coalition of parties may register their candidate should they have fulfill the threshold of at least 20 percent from the total seat of DPRD or 25 percent from accumulations of votes in the previous DPRD election in that area".<sup>13</sup>

The 20 percent of seat or 25% of votes is still a quite high qualification. Seeing the high political fragmentation in DPRT because the non-existence of parliamentary threshold, a party can hardly fulfill this qualification, hence they would have to make a coalition. Lobbying process and negotiation are also not easy, the same goes for campaign funding scheme. Meanwhile, qualification for a single candidate, which is 6,5 until 10 percent of total voters in the previous election is also considered as high. Other technical and administrative qualification are also hard, bearing in mind that candidate will have to possess a letter of endorsement from voters that are equipped with stamps and signatures, and factual verification.

The emergence of single candidates is also influenced by closed nominating process of local leader. Closes process oftentimes only benefits figures who have a close relationship with the party leader or have a huge financial power. At the same time, weak internal party regeneration causes the shortcomings of strong leaders, therefore opting to nominate candidate with higher chance of winning, or usually an incumbent.

<sup>12</sup>. Kompas, *Memenangkan Kotak Kosong*, 18 January 2017.

<sup>13</sup>. For more information, see Law No. 10/2016 Regarding Second Amendment on Law No. 1/2015 regarding Implementation of Government Regulation Replacing Law No. 1/2014 regarding Gubernurial, Regent, and Mayoral Election (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 tahun 2016 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 1 tahun 2015 tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 tahun 2014 tentang Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati dan Walikota menjadi Undang-Undang), hlm. 13.



*Second*, the tendency of a stronger political dynasty in local level. The results of Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) investigation, shows that nepotism still shadows democracy in local level during Pilkada 2017. According to ICW, there are 11 regions that were involved in political dynasty during the simultaneous Pilkada 2017.<sup>14</sup> From the real-count results done by KPU, 7 out of those 11 regions were won by candidates from political dynasty, the other 3 (three) suffered losses and 1 (one) was disqualified because of corruption.<sup>15</sup> (See Table 6)

**Talel 6.**

**Backgroud of Policial Dynasty in Pilkada 2017 and the Result of Real-Count by KPU**

No	Name	Pilkada	Position	Family	Post	Relation	Status
1	Andika Hazrumy	Banten	Candidate of Vice Governor	Ratu Atut Chosiyah	Governor 2012-2015	Mother-Son	Won
2	Hana Hasanah Fadel	Gorontalo	Candidate of Governor	Fadel Muhammad	Governor 2001-2008	Husband-Wife	Lost
3	Dodi Reza Alex Noerdin	Musi Banyuasin	Candidate of Regent	Alex Noerdin	Regent 2002-2008	Father-Son	Won
4	Adam Ishak	Mesuji	Calon Candidate of Vice Regent	Ismail Ishak	Vice Regent 2012-2016	Siblings	Lost
5	Parosil Mabsus	Lampung Barat	Candidate of Regent	Mukhlis Basri	Regent 2007- 2017	Siblings	Won
6	Atty Suharti	Kota Cimahi	Candidate of Mayor	Itoc Tochija	Mayor 2002-2007	Husband-Wife	Disqualified
7	Siti Rahma	Pringsewu	Candidate of Regent	Bachtiar Basri	Vice Governor	Father-Daughter	Lost
8	Dewanti Rumpoko	Kota Batu	Candidate of Mayor	Eddy Rumpoko	Mayor 2007-2017	Husband-Wife	Won
9	Karolin Margaret N	Landak	Candidate of Regent	Kornelis	Governor of Kalbar 2008-2018	Father-Daughter	Won
10	Noormiliyani A. S	Barito Kuala	Candidate of Regent	Hasanuddin Murad	Regent 2007-2017	Husband-Wife	Won
11	Tuasikal Abua	Maluku Tengah	Candidate of Regent	Abdullah Tuasikal	Regent 2002-2012	Siblings	Won

Source: ICW (2017) and KPU (2017)

The latest example of political dynasty can be seen in District of Central Maluku. Tuasikal Abua, Regent of Central Maluku 2012-2017, who nominate himself in Pilkada 2017, is the brother of the previous Regent, Abdullah Tuasikal, Regent of Central Maluku 2002-2012. Abdullah Tuasikal was also successful in conveying his wife and son to Senayan. His wife became the member of Indonesia's DPR in 2009-2014, and his son in 2014-2019. The continuance of political dynasty in local level occurs because political dynasty is the party leader, hence easing the nomination of their relatives within Pilkada. Some studies find political dynasties are prone to corruption, among others is study by ICW.<sup>16</sup> Rahman's analysis (2013)

<sup>14</sup>. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), *Dinasti Politik, Korupsi Kepala Daerah dan Pilkada Serentak 2017*, 2017

<sup>15</sup>. [www.pilkada2017.kpu.go.id](http://www.pilkada2017.kpu.go.id), accessed on 25 February 2017.

<sup>16</sup>. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), *Dinasti Politik, Korupsi Kepala Daerah dan Pilkada Serentak 2017*, 2017.

towards data in 100 countries as quoted by Hanan (2017), concludes that political dynasties correlate with high level of corruption.<sup>17</sup>

Data from ICW and Kompas<sup>18</sup>, reveals some local leaders who are corrupted and have relations with political dynasty within their region. Among others are Ratu Atut Chosiyah (Governor of Banten 2007-2017); Atty Suharti (Mayor of Cimahi 2012-2017); Sri Hartini (Regent of Klaten 2016-2021); Yan Anton Ferdian (Regent of Banyuasin 2013-2018); Syaekani Hasan Rais (Regent of Kutai Kartanegara 1999-2010); dan Fuad Amin (Regent of Bangkalan 2003-2012). According to ICW, the trigger of corruption within political dynasty is caused by the domination of executive, legislative, and bureaucracy, and it requires a huge funding to sustain this power and political ties. Meanwhile, according to Executive Director of Regional Autonomy Watch (Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah) Robert Endi Jaweng quoted in Kompas, the rampant corruption from political dynasty in 2017 is caused by the rise of regional fund transfer from Rp 758 trillion to Rp 764,9 trillion.

The government had regulated the prevention of political dynasty through Law No. 8/2015 regarding Gubernatorial, Reagent, and Mayoral Election. In this regulation, those who are related by marriage and blood vertically and horizontally with the incumbent shall not nominate themselves in the Pilkada, except after one year interlude. However, the norm of this Article was nullified by the Constitutional Court. According to the Constitutional Court, everyone has the equal right to nominate themselves in the Pilkada.

The high number of regional corruption case is also seen from the tolerating attitude of society towards money politics. A national survey from CSIS shows a high level of societal toleration to money politics. Almost 30 percent of respondents consider corruption as normal. The survey also shows that those who live in the rural area tend to be more tolerant towards corruption compared to those who live in urban area.<sup>19</sup> Exit Poll done by *Indikator Politik Indonesia* on 2014 Election shows around 35 percent of society justify money politics. Aside from that, 30 percent of society also admit receiving money.<sup>20</sup>

## Notes for Parties

Two simultaneous rounds of Pilkada in 2015 and 2017 show that democracy in the internal party has not work appropriately. The process to select and determine candidate has not been transparent and open. Some of political parties still nominate candidates based on relations and financial power. Those who have enough financial power would have better chance to be nominated. However, some parties had used scientific approach in nominating regional leader. Method to choose usually use surveys on public opinion. Candidate with high electability and winning chance would be easily nominated. Meanwhile, other parties use a relatively closed nomination process. This kind of process is very prone to political dowry.

The simultaneous Pilkada also shows the non-existence of pattern in party coalition. The basis to form coalition becomes grey and unpattern. Aside from that, public votes within the Pilkada is also not linear with votes on parties in the previous election. Party's base voters are not loyal to the candidate endorsed by the party. Campaign experience changes. Candidates in many places use the social media to influence voters. Besides fee, campaign in social media is deemed effective in acquiring new voters, especially those that are young and internet savvy. High internet penetration makes social media campaign an alternative, especially because social media is enthused by voters from X and Y generations.

To some extent, especially in Jakarta, campaigns and debates amongst candidate convey an imperative influence towards behavioral change of voters. A survey from SMRC shows that

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<sup>17</sup>. Djayadi Hanan, *Kompas*, Korupsi Dinasti Politik, 16 January 2017.

<sup>18</sup>. Kompas, *Dinasti Politik-Kuasa, Uang, dan Penumpang Gelap*, 10 January 2017.

<sup>19</sup>. CSIS, *Persepsi dan Pengalaman Masyarakat terhadap Fenomena Korupsi di Indonesia*, 2016.

<sup>20</sup>. Indikator Politik Indonesia, *Exit Poll Pemilu Legislatif*, 2014.

public appraisal to candidates debating performance has a strong and significant electoral implication.<sup>21</sup> According to SMRC, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama-Djarot Saiful Hidayat had an increase from 28,8 percent in December to 34,8% in January 2017 after the debate. Meanwhile, Agus-Sylvi had a decline from 30,8 percent to 22,5 percent. Whereas Anies-Sandi had a slight increase from 24,4 percent to 26,4 percent.

## **Closing**

Public optimism and trust towards the government become both an opportunity and challenge for Jokowi-JK administration in the future. In the third year, the government is expected to retain public optimism by realizing their campaign promises and increase the performance of Working Cabinet. Meanwhile, to anticipate the tendency of single candidates, lowering the qualification of candidates, be it for political party or single candidate, is one of the ways to improve the number of candidates in Pilkada. A multitude of candidate would benefit the public as it provides a plethora of alternatives for public.

As the source of political leader recruitment, political party is expected to tighten its selection process on regional candidates. Support towards corruption eradication, committed in serving the public, and those who are with integrity, are the main qualification of candidacy. Party is expected to nominate candidate with clean track record so they will not be trapped on corruption cases.

In selecting a Presidential candidate, parties are expected to start implementing democratic mechanism by conducting an internal election to determine nominated candidates in the Presidential election. Thus, potential candidates who are not the board of the party or those who do not come from professional background may nominate themselves as President.

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<sup>21</sup>. SMRC, *Debat dan Elektabilitas Paslon Pilkada DKI*, January 2017.